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Introduction  
Contemporary threats to United States security are characterized by high levels of synergy. 
Although intelligence collection and analysis is still stove-piped in ways that treat these threats as 
separate and independent, in practice, they can no longer be demarcated from one another. The 
WMD proliferation threat, the threat posed by global jihadists and the threat from transnational 
organized crime overlap and intersect in important ways.[1] The nightmare scenario is that these 
intersections will result in a WMD being brought into the United States and used to inflict large-
scale casualties that would dwarf those of September 11, 2001. Consequently, this analysis 
focuses on the possible smuggling of an improvised nuclear device (IND) into the United States. 
In considering this threat several distinct stages of activity need to be identified: 
• Phase 1: the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist networks. This can be done 
directly or indirectly. One possibility is that terrorists will themselves acquire highly 
enriched uranium or weapons grade plutonium through theft and diversion or even a raid 
on a nuclear facility. Another is that terrorists will seek to acquire such materials on the 
black market, particularly from a criminal organization. In this case, it is important to 
distinguish between the upstream phase involving the initial acquisition of strategic 
nuclear materials and the downstream phase where the materials are sold to terrorists 
hostile to the United States. Although there is some, albeit imperfect, knowledge on the 
upstream phase, there is very little on the downstream transactions.  
• Phase 2: creation of an IND. Assuming that terrorists have acquired HEU or weapons 
grade plutonium, they then have to use this to create a nuclear device. This is not an 
easy task, but is certainly not beyond the global jihad movement, with its access to 
financial resources that could be used both to find a safe haven and to acquire the 
scientific and technological expertise necessary to ensure the successful development of 
at least a rudimentary nuclear weapon.[2]  
• Phase 3: the end game. In this phase terrorists seek to bring their nuclear device into the 
United States. Once again, this can be done either directly or using the smuggling 
expertise of organized crime. The terrorists could exploit the routes and methods drug 
traffickers and people smugglers have developed or look for alternatives of their own. 
With the latter alternative, their menu of choices is extensive.  
The focus in this chapter is on the initial material acquisition phase and the end game; the 
weaponization process itself is not considered. Although the second phase is critical, it goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter—which seeks to illuminate the smuggling dimensions of the 
threat. 
Links or contacts between criminal and terrorist networks could be of critical importance in the 
acquisition phase but are unlikely to be nearly as relevant in the end game. Put somewhat 
differently, while criminal organizations might well sell nuclear materials to terrorists, they are 
unlikely—at least knowingly—to assist in smuggling a nuclear device into the United States. This 
should not encourage complacency. Even if criminal organizations were willing to assist in the 
end-game smuggling effort, terrorists would almost certainly want to retain a high degree of 
control over both the process and the weapon. Furthermore, the choices available to terrorists 
pose formidable challenges for both detection and interdiction. Countering these requires 
additional approaches that go beyond the very substantial steps the United States is already 
taking to counter the smuggling threat. Some of these approaches to both the acquisition stage 
and end-game are outlined briefly in the final section. 
The Acquisition of Nuclear Materials 
The possibility that terrorists will engage in their own nuclear theft and smuggling activities has 
been raised by reports from Russia that terrorists have engaged in surveillance of nuclear 
facilities.[3] They might even have considered a “smash and grab” raid that would acquire 
strategic materials through direct assault and blatant theft. The difficulty is that this would be 
noisily overt, resulting in hot pursuit and a systematic mobilization of state resources to track 
down both perpetrators and materials. The risks would be very high as would the potential costs. 
And even if the subsequent pursuit was unsuccessful, the incident would reverberate 
internationally, confirming that nuclear terrorism is a real threat and thereby making the end game 
of getting an IND into the United States more difficult. 
A second possibility is that terrorists would simply contract out the materials acquisition process, 
hiring a criminal organization or trafficking network to steal the materials and then transfer their 
ownership for the agreed upon payment. Such an arrangement would be far less likely to set off 
alarm bells than a direct assault. From the terrorists’ perspective, however, it would require a 
great deal of trust, as they would be required to make an up front payment prior to the theft and 
delivery of the materials. The criminals could then renege on the deal—quitting while they are 
ahead and disappearing with the advance—or prove unsuccessful in their efforts to acquire the 
material. Alternatively, they could be detected and turned by the authorities who could then carry 
out a seller sting operation against the terrorists. Such risks aside, the attraction of this approach 
from the terrorist perspective is that it does not leave acquisition to the vagaries of the market. 
The attraction might not be sufficient to outweigh the risks. 
The third possibility, therefore, is simply for terrorists to work within the existing black market in 
nuclear materials, hope that sufficient material is available, and find a reliable seller. This will not 
necessarily be easy. Much of the black market trade has involved nothing more than radioactive 
junk, while scams and fraudulent offers of weapons-grade material have also been almost 
common-place. Yet, the number of cases involving weapons grade material has been sufficient to 
sufficient to make this a plausible option for the terrorists. According to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), between 1993 and 2005 there were 16 confirmed incidents involving 
trafficking in HEU or plutonium.[4] More recently, in January 2006, Georgian authorities arrested 
a Russian who was carrying 100 grams of highly enriched uranium.[5] Although the amounts of 
weapons-grade material have remained relatively small, the very discovery of this material being 
trafficked suggests that this might be the preferred option for terrorists. 
This is reinforced by the involvement of criminal organizations, criminal-controlled companies, 
and ethnic trafficking networks in the nuclear material smuggling business.[6] In 2001, for 
example, the Balashikha criminal organization was involved in two separate incidents of nuclear 
material trafficking. In March, members of the group were arrested while trying to buy cesium and 
authorities seized $250,000 dollars in cash. Reportedly the gang members were acting as 
intermediaries and already had buyers from the Middle East.[7] Six members of the same group 
were arrested in December 2001, while trying to sell 1.068 kilograms of low enriched uranium for 
$30,000 dollars.[8] Cases of organized crime involvement in nuclear material trafficking have also 
occurred in various parts of Ukraine including Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk. In some cases, there 
has also been a high degree of sophistication in trafficking modes and methods, with the use of 
import-export companies to provide cover for illegal transactions. 
The trafficking networks also appear to regard nuclear materials as simply another illegal product 
that can turn a profit. Turkish networks traditionally engaged in antiquities smuggling, for example, 
became involved in the nuclear material black market, simply adding nuclear materials to the 
other illegal goods they traded. In short, nuclear materials have become merely another 
commodity, and those who have stolen or diverted them have looked for buyers simply to make 
money. This deprives these materials of any special status apart from their worth on the black 
market. What is considered at a strategic level by the United States government as a key 
component of countering both proliferation and terrorism is seen at a micro-level as simply a 
business transaction—albeit an illegal one—and a potential source of profit. From the terrorists’ 
perspective this is a source of opportunities. 
Since the mid-1990s, the major nuclear smuggling routes have gone through the Caucasus, the 
Balkans, Turkey and Central Asia—all areas where the global jihad movement has had a 
significant presence.[9] Although there is no evidence in open sources of nuclear materials being 
supplied to terrorists, it is certainly conceivable that connections were made between sellers of 
diverted nuclear material and representatives of terrorist organizations. Those who have stolen, 
diverted or otherwise acquired nuclear materials are interested in finding buyers. During the 
1990s, seizures and arrests made through sting operations made this much riskier, while the 
deployment of portal monitors made successful smuggling through border posts more difficult. 
Penalties have also been increased as governments have started to realize the dangers involved. 
Yet, this has had little impact: continued reports of seizures and arrests suggest that the business 
has continued more or less as normal. Risks might have increased but are not prohibitive. In 
these circumstances, it is conceivable that a criminal group might well be willing to supply nuclear 
material to a terrorist organization. Any scruples criminals might have about this, could be 
overcome by terrorists using a designated buyer not obviously connected to them. This would 
allow the criminals to do a deal with plausible deniability. 
There is also considerable distance—both functionally and geographically—between the sale of 
these materials and their subsequent use as part of a weapon. In contrast, smuggling an IND into 
the United States involves an entirely new dimension of risk. It is not something that could easily 
be treated as simply another product and the smugglers would know that if the weapon were 
subsequently used, they would become the target of a global dragnet. Nevertheless, the 
possibility that criminal organizations might assist terrorists in smuggling an IND into the United 
States cannot simply be ruled out without further consideration. 
The End Game: Organized Crime and Smuggling an IND into the United 
States 
Would a criminal organization be willing and able to smuggle an IND into the United States? The 
answer under most, but not all, circumstances is probably no: those willing to do so would not 
have the capacity while those with the ability would not have the willingness. There are complex 
but reinforcing reasons for reluctance, ranging from concerns about risk and retribution to a 
reluctance to disrupt existing illegal markets and their accompanying revenue streams. Moreover, 
organized crime is about the provision of illegal goods and services, and the exploitation of 
criminal opportunities for profit. Criminal organizations frequently use violence but it is generally 
limited and selective. They are not typically in the business of killing a lot of people. This is not 
moral inhibitions; the criminal calculation is utilitarian and while limited violence might be good for 
criminal business, large-scale violence is just the opposite. Not only does such violence bring 
unwanted attention to the criminals, it also tends to lead to crackdowns by authorities. For 
criminal organizations intent on maximizing opportunities and limiting risks, therefore, large-scale 
violence is imprudent. So too is an overly close connection with terrorists 
Nevertheless, under some circumstances, some criminal organizations might be willing to assist 
terrorists in smuggling an IND into the United States. While this would be a high-risk activity for 
any criminal organization, the risk might not always be prohibitive. In fact, the willingness of a 
criminal organization to assist in this task would probably depend on: the degree of risk that a 
criminal organization is willing to accept in relation to the rewards that are offered; the extent to 
which a criminal organization also has a political agenda or an ideological or religious affinity that 
makes it willing to cooperate with a terrorist organization; and the degree of knowledge that the 
criminal enterprise has about the task it is being asked to carry out and what is really involved. 
Each of these dimensions must be considered in order to provide a broad assessment of the 
options available to terrorist organizations. 
1. The unwilling: criminal organizations with low propensity for risk-taking 
Most criminal organizations not only seek to obtain significant profits from crime, but also want to 
enjoy the proceeds. Consequently, risks have to be modest and controllable. Even if very high 
rewards were offered by a terrorist organization for smuggling an IND into the United States, 
these rewards would not be sufficient so long as a group was making significant profits from its 
existing criminal enterprises, believed it would continue to make such profits in an environment 
characterized by acceptable risks, and recognized that agreeing to smuggle IND would be a high 
risk activity—which if successful would almost certainly lead to subsequent identification and 
retribution. In short, for a successful criminal organization, the risks incurred in assisting a terrorist 
organization to smuggle an IND into the United States would be prohibitive. 
For some criminal groups—particularly Mexican drug trafficking organizations and Mexican and 
Chinese alien-smuggling networks—additional considerations militate against this kind of 
cooperation with terrorists. Not least, the United States is their most important market and they 
would not want to do anything that disturbs the market. Moreover, for Mexicans, there are often 
family members and friends in the United States who would be put in harm’s way by an IND 
attack. Chinese alien smugglers, often called snake-heads, are in a similar position. They have 
displayed a capacity to bring ships to the United States and offload them before law enforcement 
and immigration authorities can react. Consequently, they are a natural candidate for terrorists 
looking for smuggling partners. Yet, they have a long-term business in which the United States is 
promised land and customer for cheap labor, rolled into one. Assisting a terrorist organization in 
turning the United States into a target for an IND is not readily compatible with maintaining it as 
the major destination for Chinese immigrants. A one-off payment would have to be particularly 
attractive, therefore, for the offer even to be considered, let alone accepted. 
Groups more susceptible to such offers would typically be struggling and looking for an 
opportunity to turn things around. A criminal organization not doing particularly well might be 
willing to engage in high-risk behavior for significant financial gains. For such a group a terrorist 
offer would certainly be more attractive than for competitors with large, diverse, and reliable 
income streams—although the obvious risks might still be sufficient to act as a deterrent. Even for 
groups not particularly successful in their criminal ventures, there is no point in making enormous 
amounts of money from a one-off venture without subsequent opportunities to enjoy the proceeds. 
Consequently, an offer to pay for IND smuggling is an offer that can, and probably will, be refused. 
Accepting the offer is unlikely if the group has any real capacity to assess risk. And even this, 
assumes that the terrorist network would deign to use a second-rate as opposed to a highly 
successful criminal organization. Moreover, it is unlikely that a second-rate group would have the 
capacity to smuggle a weapon into the United States even if it were willing to try. 
2. Willing collaborators 
The only kind of criminal organization responsive to an offer by a terrorist network to pay large 
amounts of money to smuggle an IND into the United States is likely to be either sympathetic to 
the cause pursued by the terrorists or particularly hostile towards the United States. Such an 
organization will be more predisposed than most other criminal organizations towards acceptance 
of such a proposal, even though in strictly business and risk management terms it is not 
compelling. Chechen groups linked to the global jihad might be particularly willing to entertain 
such ideas, less because of a cost-gain calculation of criminal business than some kind of 
attachment to the common cause. Similarly, Albanian criminal organizations with a fundamentalist 
orientation might be prepared to take greater risks in support of global jihad. Yet, even if such 
groups are willing, it is not clear that they able to meet the demands of the task required 
In sum, most organized crime groups will want nothing to do with smuggling an IND into the 
United States on behalf of a terrorist organization. Exceptions cannot be ruled out, but such 
groups are likely to be handicapped by limited skills and resources. There is, however, an 
additional wrinkle in all this. The rejection scenarios depend on a criminal organization having 
comprehensive and clear information about what it is being asked to do. Unfortunately, a criminal 
organization could be used by a terrorist network to smuggle an IND into the United States 
without knowing exactly what it is doing. 
3. Unwitting collaborators 
At first sight the prospect of a criminal organization being duped into smuggling an IND into the 
United States might appear somewhat far-fetched; in fact it is plausible. It requires simply that a 
terrorist organization approach a criminal organization specializing in smuggling and offer some 
kind of contract for services rendered. This could be done through an intermediary or front and 
would typically involve a container of contraband (which might be drugs, arms, endangered 
species, cultural artifacts, stolen goods, or even illegal aliens). Every aspect of the transaction—
including the price that is paid, the route that is followed, and the methods of deception or 
circumvention—would be typical of such illicit transactions. The only difference would be an IND 
concealed within the contraband. Unless the criminal organization typically inspects such 
containers (and the probability is that criminal brokers and traffickers of this kind are simply 
concerned about being paid and do not do due diligence on customer or cargo) then it could 
provide unwitting assistance to a terrorist organization. 
In short, a criminal organization could become the unwitting tool of terrorists. So too could 
marginal businesses that are ostensibly legitimate but do not ask too many questions to those for 
whom they provide services. Couriers, transportation services, and even moving companies 
could all too easily be exploited by terrorist organizations. Even in the United States some of 
these companies are disreputable in their behavior, in some cases, bordering on the criminal. In 
many other countries, criminality and corruption pervade the freight-forwarding business, thereby 
providing opportunities for terrorist groups to use their services, without questions being asked or 
suspicions being raised. In other words, when considering the prospects for a criminal 
organization or shady business to work with terrorist networks and smuggle an IND into the 
United States, the degree of knowledge of an organized crime group about who is hiring its 
services and what the shipment might contain is critical. 
There is another side to this equation however. A terrorist network might not want to entrust an 
IND to a criminal organization. Concerns that the criminals will discover the real nature of their 
cargo and balk at the prospect might be prohibitive. Furthermore, most criminal organizations will 
typically be regarded by terrorists as mercenary and for sale to the highest bidder. Because an 
IND is a precious commodity for terrorists, they will be reluctant to transfer it to a group not 
committed to the cause and, therefore, not fully trusted. In the final analysis, therefore, terrorist 
networks might prefer to take on the task themselves. Consequently, the next section looks at 
some of the conveyances, routes, and methods available to a terrorist group intent on smuggling 
an IND into the United States. In effect, it develops what might be understood as a process model 
of IND smuggling. 
The End Game: Terrorists and the Smuggling Process 
Although terrorists as smugglers have a variety of options, their choices are not unlimited. On the 
contrary, smuggling is a bounded activity. This makes it possible to disaggregate the process and 
develop a generic smuggling model, which can be understood in terms of three dimensions:  
• Smuggling as a geographic problem. Smuggling can be understood, in part at least, as 
the movement of a product (whether drugs, diamonds, endangered species or an IND), 
from its existing location to a desired location that can be a target market or a target for 
destruction.  
• Smuggling as a transportation issue. Unless an IND is developed by terrorists within the 
United States city in which they intend to use it, certain kinds of conveyances have to be 
used to move it to the target. Unless a weapon is developed in the Western Hemisphere 
then air or maritime conveyances are essential at some stage in the transportation 
process.  
• Smuggling as an adversarial process. Smuggling always involves efforts to outsmart 
those with the responsibility for preventing it. Consequently, the smuggling process 
involves choices about methods that can overcome the obstacles. In some countries, 
these barriers are little more than minor complications easily overcome. In others, the 
challenge for the smuggler is more formidable. Yet smugglers have a repertoire of 
options available for overcoming the barriers: concealment, deception, circumvention, 
and facilitation. These can be understood in part as alternative options, but can also be 
combined in ways designed to make it harder to detect and interdict the smuggling 
process.  
Each of these dimensions must be examined with particular attention to the advantages and 
disadvantages of the available options for a terrorist network seeking to smuggle WMD into the 
United States.  
1. The Geography of Smuggling 
Thinking about smuggling as a geographic issue requires explicitly consideration of locations and 
the spaces between locations. Certainly terrorists intent on smuggling an IND into the United 
States have many choices to make in terms of locations and routes. 
The target could be anywhere in the Continental United States, but is likely to be a major city, 
probably—but not necessarily—on or near the coast. The United States has numerous cities with 
a million people or more and there are three major port cities on the Atlantic coast—Boston, New 
York, and Miami—three on the Pacific coast—Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle—as well 
as several on the Gulf Coast—most notably New Orleans and Houston—all of which are 
attractive targets for an IND attack by terrorists. 
The point of entry could be a major container port; a remote coastal area; an official port of entry 
from Canada or Mexico; a remote portion of the Southwest Border with Mexico; or a remote part 
of the Northern Border with Canada. Each of these points of entry presents different kinds of 
obstacles and risks. Coming in to a major container port or official points of entry at the land 
borders would encounter monitoring devices that could result in detection. Coming in at a remote 
coastal area, therefore, might be preferable. The problem is that it would still be necessary to 
move the weapon to its final target. In contrast, a major port could itself be a very attractive target 
for terrorists, particularly if the objective is to hurt the United States economically through the 
disruption of trade. 
The point of embarkation could be in an Islamic country, a country hostile to the United States, or 
a less obvious country subject to less scrutiny. In this connection, the United States has added an 
additional layer of scrutiny and security through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), designed 
“to protect containerized shipping from exploitation by terrorists.”[10] The scheme exploits 
“intelligence and automated information to identify and target high-risk containers” pre-screens 
high-risk containers at the port of departure, makes use of detection technologies for screening 
and emphasizes “smarter, tamper proof containers.”[11] The scheme has developed rapidly and 
by September 2006 operated at about 50 ports worldwide.[12] In addition, in December 2006 the 
Departments of Energy and Homeland Security launched the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and 
deploying radiation detection equipment for container scanning to foreign ports.[13] Initially 
operating at six ports this scheme will gradually be extended. Consequently, terrorists trying to 
smuggle an IND into the United States will confront a choice: do they try to embark from a port 
that is included in the CSI and/or the SFI or do they opt for an easier point of dispatch. Opting for 
a port that is part of the CSI carries additional risks at the point of embarkation. These are likely to 
be even greater with the SFI monitors. On the other hand, if the container with an IND inside 
passes through a CSI port, it might be subject to less scrutiny as it enters the United States. 
Conversely those containers that do not come with a prior seal of approval are more likely to be 
subject to intense and thorough scrutiny when they reach the United States. The tradeoff 
calculation depends in part on the perceived effectiveness of the CSI. 
Another key component of the geographic of smuggling is the choice of a direct or indirect route 
between the point of embarkation and the point of entry into the United States. Coming in from 
Canada or Mexico is obviously an indirect route for shipments from other countries and might be 
an attractive option for terrorists seeking to smuggle a WMD into the United States. Alternatively, 
they might seek entry not via the immediate neighbors of the United States but via a country such 
as Britain or Italy, which would arouse little suspicion. A South American country such as Brazil 
might also be attractive as it would possibly be seen as an innocuous point of departure. The 
difficulty with an indirect route is that it is first of all necessary to get the weapon to this location 
and then transfer it to a container or vessel bound for the United States. Even if this creates 
additional risks of detection en route, these might be outweighed by less scrutiny at the US 
border. 
2. Smuggling as a transportation issue 
Another critical issue for terrorist organizations intent on smuggling an IND into the United States 
is choice of conveyance. Initially this appears simply as a matter of choosing land, sea, or air, but 
in fact the issue is both broader and deeper than this. It is broader since it is possible to develop 
both dual and triple combinations using all three types of conveyance; it is deeper because of the 
availability of multiple options within each category. If the choice is made to smuggle an IND into 
the United States by air, for example, terrorists could opt for air freight, or a small private plane, 
perhaps coming from the Caribbean into Florida. This last option was widely used by Medellin 
drug trafficking organizations in the 1980s. They brought large planes into Norman’s Cay in the 
Bahamas and offloaded drugs onto smaller planes that merged with the weekend leisure traffic 
flying into Florida. Similarly, if the choice is made to use ships, there is once again the issue of 
whether to opt for a container ship, an oil tanker, a passenger ship or a small private boat. It is 
also possible to envisage a route that mixes the conveyances. One alternative, for example, 
might be to ship or fly something into Mexico or Canada and then try to bring it over the border 
into the United States either by truck or private vehicle (whether van or car), or via the railway 
system as some kind of freight. The possible drawback to mixing conveyances is that the point of 
transfer might also be a potential point of vulnerability, although in part this would depend on the 
size of the weapon and the methods of concealment. The smaller, more portable the weapon, the 
less vulnerable transfer would be and the fewer inhibitions on adopting such an approach. 
Several other aspects of the transportation issue are also worth considering. Decisions on 
conveyances depend on variations in the level of scrutiny likely to accompany an incoming 
conveyance, the ease of minimizing detection, the degree to which one kind of conveyance is 
regarded by United States authorities as less threatening than others, the ease of loading and 
unloading without arousing suspicion, and the proximity to the final target using this method of 
transportation. 
One possibility is that of using a ship to bring in an IND. This is not as outrageous as it might 
appear. A few years after September 11, reports suggested that al-Qaeda owned or controlled a 
number of cargo ships.[14] Estimates differed with some suggesting 15 and others putting the 
figure anywhere between 12 and 50.[15] Although some progress has been made in identifying 
and monitoring these ships, it is unlikely that this task is complete—largely because of the 
problem of differentiating them from most of the 120,000 merchant ships plying their trade around 
the world.[16] Flags of convenience (FOC) for ship registration remain the equivalent in the 
maritime sphere of offshore financial centers and bank secrecy havens in the financial world, 
hiding beneficial ownership, minimizing transparency, and facilitating criminal and other 
malevolent activities. According to the General Secretary of the International Transport Workers 
Federation, “Corruption and lack of accountability are endemic in the FOC system, which is built 
on two pillars: no questions asked of ship owners and no questions answered to anyone else. 
When a ship is registered with one of these flags, a curtain of secrecy descends--as valuable if 
you're a terrorist as if you're a money launderer, someone who wants to sink a ship for insurance, 
or work its crew half to death before abandoning them unpaid in a foreign port.”[17] The FOC 
system and the layers of corporate ownership and front companies that accompany it, provide a 
veil of anonymity that allow criminals and terrorists alike to transport all sorts of illicit goods 
including possible an IND.[18] Inroads have been made against flags of convenience as both 
Liberia and Panama, the two largest shipping registries for these flags have “agreed to allow 
those countries that are part of the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to board ships 
sailing under their flags in the high seas if they are suspected of carrying weapons of mass 
destruction.”[19] Nevertheless, the system still provides an additional opportunity for deception. 
The task of vessel monitoring is further complicated by the capacity of terrorists for using 
deception and what have been termed “phantom ships” In Southeast Asian waters at any one 
time there are believed to be as many as a dozen ships operating under false names and with 
false papers. These ships never make their destination port; instead cargo is offloaded elsewhere 
and the ship renamed. Such schemes typically involve theft, insurance fraud, and the use of the 
ships for illegal shipments, and are difficult to combat.[20] 
Even so, an attempt by al-Qaeda to sail a ship with an IND on board into a major United States 
port would face serious obstacles. Maritime intelligence has been enhanced through the use of 
“large databases to track cargo ships and their crews and check them for ‘anomalies’ that could 
indicate terrorist plots”.[21] At the same time, the volume of licit trade provides a high degree of 
noise and clutter, making indications of an IND plot difficult to detect. Constant flux in the shipping 
business with changes of ownership and registration make it extremely difficult to distinguish 
between legitimate ships carrying licit cargos, legitimate ships carrying illicit commodities, and a 
terrorist ship with an IND on board. In these circumstances, and in spite of the PSI, the ship 
option could be a viable alternative for al-Qaeda, with success depending on the ability to create 
a plausible front, obtain a legitimate cargo for cover, and come to the United States from a port 
regarded as relatively innocuous. None of these requirements presents an insurmountable 
obstacle for a global jihad movement with a long and successful history of document fraud, 
experience in the use of front companies, and considerable involvement in the import-export 
world.  
These skills are also relevant to containers. In this connection, terrorists not only have to contend 
with the CSI discussed above, but also with the Automated Targeting System used by Customs 
to identify high-risk containers, and the more recent SFI.[22] Yet given the size and complexity of 
the global freight-forwarding industry, the opportunities for terrorists to embed themselves in 
reputable and trusted companies are very real. The insider threat has received a lot of attention in 
the world of computer or cyber crime; it requires similar attention in the world of freight-forwarding, 
shipping and even government. Insiders in a government or security agency can provide false 
authentication that security standards are met or that security checks have been completed. An 
insider or front company in contrast simply establishes a set of standard operational procedures 
for shipment that become the norm: a malevolent or illegitimate shipment that does not deviate 
(apart from the IND in its contents) from this norm will not raise red flags. When compliance 
becomes both routine and expected, the prospects for exploiting the trust that has been 
established are very real. This is linked to the notion of smuggling as a competitive or adversarial 
process. 
3. Smuggling as an adversarial process 
For those intent on smuggling an IND into the United States, choices of routes and conveyances 
will be determined part by assessments of the US capacity for detection and interdiction. The 
defensive measures that have been put in place since September 11 have clearly increased this 
capacity. Yet, given the problem of discrimination between commerce and smuggling and the 
implicit and sometimes explicit requirement for balancing security against the facilitation of trade, 
vulnerabilities remain. Given the sheer impossibility of sealing the borders and ensuring that all 
feasible points of entry are equally impermeable to smuggling, soft spots, whether geographic 
(point of entry) or functional (transportation method of entry) remain. The notion of smuggling as 
an adversarial process, although hardly novel, also suggests the need to consider the smuggler’s 
toolkit. In this connection, four methods of smuggling can be identified: concealment, deception, 
facilitation, and circumvention. The first three all involve efforts to pass through the inspection 
process without detection; the fourth simply seeks to circumvent inspections altogether. 
Concealment methods are based on an explicit acknowledgement that if the shipment is 
discovered it will be seized; deception methods generally involve the portrayal of the shipment as 
legal in the expectation that entry would be permitted without too much scrutiny; while facilitation 
is designed to degrade the quality of the inspection process. Circumvention (which is related to 
the prior discussion about points of entry) will be the preferred option when confidence is lacking 
about the prospects for effective concealment, deception, or facilitation. The categories are not 
quite as distinct as this discussion suggests however. Overlap between concealment and 
deception is common, while one or more of these methods might be combined with efforts at 
facilitation. Nevertheless, this typology of smuggling methods highlights the choices are available 
to terrorists. 
To suggest that the simplest trafficking method is concealment is not to under-estimate the 
ingenuity or effort involved in many concealment schemes. Smugglers using overland routes to 
bring drugs, endangered species, antiquities, or other contraband into the United States often 
develop elaborate schemes for concealment in their vehicles. There have even been cases 
where a compartment has been created underneath the car dashboard for a small person to hide. 
The opportunities for concealment are even greater in commercial loads. Significantly, however, 
trucks crossing the Mexican border with drugs inside are often not modified in any way, relying 
simply on legitimate loads such as fruits and vegetables to hide the contraband. A shotgun 
approach ensures passage of enough of the drugs to yield healthy profits. Once again, though, 
such an option is not really available for a terrorist organization—partly because of the use of 
portal monitors to detect radioactivity and partly because they cannot afford any seizure. 
Consequently, an effort to bring an IND into the United States would have to rely on other 
methods such as deception. 
The use of deception is an important alternative and has at least two dimensions. The first is 
disguise. Commodities being smuggled are sometimes kept in plain sight and simply presented 
as legitimate in declarations to customs authorities. This approach is particularly effective in the 
case of dual use items where it is difficult to distinguish a weapon or component from something 
innocuous. For this method to be used for an IND, however, would probably require some 
concealment too. Bringing in a weapon in a load of scrap metal or integrating it into medical 
equipment—which could also provide a rationale for radioactivity—would mix deception and 
concealment and compound the problem of detection. 
An integral part of deception is the use of false documents. This is widespread in the smuggling 
of endangered species where false export permits and re-exports certificates under CITES (the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species) greatly facilitate the trade.[23] Such 
an approach might well have at least a partial counterpart in an IND smuggling venture. It is 
possible, for example, to change bills of lading to provide a false point of embarkation from a low-
risk jurisdiction unlikely to provoke suspicion or concern. Alternatively, it might be possible to use 
legitimate export and import licenses for weapons or machinery along with efforts to disguise an 
IND as a legitimate part of a consignment. In this connection, a GAO test in December 2005 
(detailed of which were released in March 2006) showed how false documentation could be used 
to bring radioactive materials into the United States. Although this proved controversial with critics 
claiming that the amount was so small that it was meaningless, the exercise clearly revealed a 
potential vulnerability of customs to deception.[24] One congressional staffer noted that although 
the good news was that the radiation portal monitors were effective, the bad news was that the 
use of fraudulent documents facilitated the passage of the material into the United States 
anyway.[25]  
Smuggling, of whatever kind and form is made easier through corruption and cooption of insiders. 
In the drug business, for example, buying the acquiescence of customs officers who simply have 
to look the other way has been a very important facilitator. Sometimes acquiescence is obtained 
through a mix of bribery and coercion, or what Colombian drug traffickers traditionally described 
as a choice between lead and silver. For most of those faced with two such stark alternatives 
there is no real choice. This is more difficult at the port of entry to the United States than it is at 
either the point of embarkation or in transshipment countries.[26] Nevertheless, corruption on US 
borders is a huge vulnerability that can not be dismissed. It is not something that simply exists in 
Russia and Central Asia, Colombia and Mexico; it is also something that has become increasingly 
pervasive on the US side of its southern border with Mexico. There have already been major 
convictions of corrupt officials on the Southwest border who accepted bribes to facilitate the 
passage of people or drugs.[27] Moreover, it was reported in October 2006 that since 2004 at 
least 200 public employees had been charged with helping to move drugs and people across the 
border while thousands more cases of corruption were under investigation.[28] Disturbing as the 
numbers was the pervasive nature of the phenomenon which included “Border Patrol agents, 
local police, a county sheriff, motor vehicle clerks, an FBI supervisor, immigration examiners, 
prison guards, school district officials and uniformed personnel of every branch of the U.S. 
military.”[29] Although it could be argued that even those who accept bribes from drug traffickers 
or people smugglers would not do so from terrorists, the problem is that corrupt officials are 
unlikely to do due diligence on their paymasters. Consequently, corruption has become a national 
security problem for the United States.  
The other approach is to opt to go around customs check points and enter the United States 
without coming through an official port of entry. This is a method that Mexican coyotes use to 
bring illegal aliens into the United States, smuggling them through inhospitable desert and hostile 
terrain as an alternative to the formal points of entry. Such an approach, however, carries its own 
risk, not only from the United States Border Patrol but also from vigilante groups, intent on 
combating illegal immigration. Certainly, on the Southwest border such an approach is a high risk 
activity as is evident from the number of illegal aliens who die in the desert after crossing the 
border. The northern border with Canada is, in parts at least, less inhospitable and drug 
traffickers, people smugglers and other contraband smugglers use Indian reservations and 
remote crossing areas to outwit efforts at interdiction. Such an approach could work for a terrorist 
organization. Indeed, had Ahmed Ressam come into the United States through circumvention 
rather than a formal port of entry, the Millennium plot to attack LAX might well have succeeded.  
Conclusions and Recommendations  
In net assessment terms, there is both good news and bad news. The bad news is that the 
smugglers have the advantage. The capacity to embed illegal or dangerous cargo in legitimate 
shipments poses major problems of discrimination and detection for those attempting to combat 
smuggling. Consequently, smugglers are successful most of the time. Interdiction rates vary, 
depending on the product being interdicted, but rarely exceed a third of all shipments. Moreover, 
smuggling is highly dynamic. As customs authorities and law enforcement agencies become 
aware of which methods and modalities are being used, and close them off with interdiction 
strategies, smugglers adapt their strategies and tactics to ensure minimal losses.  
The good news, as discussed above, is that significant initiatives have been taken to secure 
commerce against terrorist exploitation. Moreover, terrorist organizations, as yet, have developed 
only limited skills in smuggling. Furthermore, an IND being smuggled into the United States 
differs significantly from a marketable product for which there is a highly lucrative demand. 
Terrorists are less likely than criminals to have a smuggling infrastructure; they do not have 
established routes, highly effective methods of concealment or deception, or existing patterns of 
corruption and facilitation. In addition, an IND being smuggled into the United States is likely to be 
a unique asset; its seizure would be an enormous setback.  
The bad news about the good news is that it will not last. At best it spells only temporary relief. As 
terrorist groups engage in more and more criminal activities such as counterfeiting, smuggling of 
a variety of illegal products, document fraud, and credit-card fraud, their level of skill and 
sophistication is also likely to rise. Recognizing that insider connivance is a great facilitator of the 
smuggling process, terrorists will make long term efforts to embed individuals and companies in 
positions where they can facilitate that process. And even if “insiders” are not yet in place, their 
absence might be insufficient to forestall a smuggling attempt. After all, terrorists need too 
succeed only once. And a smuggling attack would appeal considerably to organizations that do 
not play by any rules, and typically seek to create surprise and shock. These organizations are 
extremely good at creating opportunities and exploiting government weaknesses—particularly the 
seams of vulnerability created and perpetuated by inter-departmental and inter-agency rivalries. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the bad news outweighs the good news. Yet, there are several 
additional things, beyond the measures already taken, that can be done towards leveling the 
playing field. The first is the continued allocation of increased resources to inspection and 
detection. The further development and wider deployment of technological devices that provide 
high confidence screening while also ensuring that “check points do not become choke points” is 
an important component of a successful anti-smuggling effort.[30] Even more important, though, 
is how resources are used—and this depends on how the smuggling threat is understood. It is not 
simply an inspection or detection problem that can be reduced to manageable proportions by 
innovative technologies. Ultimately, it is an intelligence problem. As a former Customs official 
noted “The best scientific aid I know is a good informer.”[31] Indeed, interdiction is critically 
dependent on good intelligence. In connection with the preceding analysis, this is true both at the 
material acquisition stage and the end game. In both cases, it also requires that intelligence 
agents, recognize the importance of alternative power structures and criminals as a critical source 
of information. The regions though which nuclear materials have been trafficked are typically 
thought of lawless. In fact, “regions beyond government control are rarely as chaotic as they 
seem to be to Western officials.”[32] Often they are subject to alternate forms of governance 
whether from drug lords, criminal bosses, tribal and clan leaders, or other local power brokers. 
“Eastern Turkey in the Kurdish hinterland along the border with Iran”, for example, is “prime 
smuggling country” for stolen nuclear material; yet as William Langewiesche has noted, “the 
entire region is entirely sewed up…nothing moves there without notice, and …any transborder 
activity requires approval.[33] Arriving at an understanding with the local power brokers, therefore, 
is critical to combating nuclear material smuggling in the region. Something very similar is 
essential on the US southern border. People smugglers and even drug traffickers can be an 
invaluable source for United States intelligence and need to be quietly mobilized and co-opted as 
part of a comprehensive detection effort. On the border with Canada efforts to develop informants 
on Indian reservations could also be critical. Similar levels of effort need to be expended on 
individuals and companies in the freight-forward industry. In the final analysis, intelligence is 
essential to ensure that the CSI does not provide opportunities for “trusted” firms to exploit the 
faith placed in them.  
Another crucial innovation is the pooling and sharing of knowledge and information about 
smuggling methods—among agencies and across national borders. Precedents for this include 
efforts to combat money laundering through the Egmont Group, an informal association of 
Financial Intelligence Units from various countries, which engages in information-sharing, in part 
through face to face meetings and in part through a secure intra-net. It is perhaps not surprising, 
therefore, that the FBI has taken the lead in trying to create something similar to combat nuclear 
terrorism. In this connection, the WMD Directorate, established by the FBI in July 2006, ran a 
conference in June 2007 at which 28 nations participated.[34] The “Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism Law Enforcement Conference” was presented as an attempt to build capacity 
of other nations but was also intended to enhance the dialogue with partner agencies, to 
strengthen international information sharing and perhaps ultimately to provide a basis for joint 
operations. 
In effect, the FBI’s initiative can be understood as an attempt to create law enforcement networks 
to combat smuggling and terrorist networks. A critical part of this must be the development and 
refinement of a set of warning indicators related to smuggling of WMD—an indicator list that 
would represent the collective wisdom of the individuals and institutions involved in the network 
and could focus both intelligence collection and intelligence analysis. This development of 
warning indicators could also be strengthened by red teaming. The United States needs to do a 
candid two-level appraisal of its continued vulnerabilities to smuggling: an internal assessment of 
the continued vulnerabilities; and an effort to understand terrorists’ perceptions of those 
vulnerabilities. Red-teaming could identify what information is publicly and readily available to a 
terrorist organization about the degree of scrutiny at different ports of entry, the inspections 
typically applied to different modalities of transportation, and the standard operational procedures 
for search and discovery. The red team approach would also facilitate the development of richer, 
more fully-developed scenarios that could inform the efforts to combat IND smuggling. 
None of these measures is a panacea. Even with a comprehensive multi-faceted attempt to 
develop intelligence for the terrorist smuggling threat, the challenges remain formidable, the 
prospects for success, uncertain. Yet, unless further efforts are taken in this direction, the 
prospects for the successful smuggling of an IND into the United States will remain unacceptably 
high. 
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